Inhalt des Dokuments
|Prof. Piotr Faliszewski, AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow|
|Monday, October 28, 2013, 2:15 p.m., Mathematikgebäude, room MA 041|
There are many ways in which a society can elect a parliament to govern in its stead. However, many of these methods have various flaws. Some choose parliaments that do not represent the members of the society proportionally, some focus too much on voters' top preferences, and some... have too high computational complexity to use in practice! In this talk we will survey some recent progress on the hardness of winner determination for these difficult parliament-electing rules (such as Monroe's rule and Chamberlin--Courant's rule). We will also introduce and discuss some of their axiomatic properties.
Prof. Piotr Faliszewski is a top expert for computational social choice; preference aggregation; complexity of elections and related issues. Out of several hundred nominated candidates, he recently won a prestigious research award (for all disciplines) by the Polish weekly magazine "Polityka" for his research on computational social choice (for those of you who can read Polish, see www.polityka.pl/nauka/1526381,1,13-edycja-nagrod-naukowych-polityki---znamy-finalistow.read
Based on a DFG Mercator fellowship, Prof. Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow) is visiting the group Algorithmik und Komplexitätstheorie in September and October (and will be returning for a few months next year).
ContactProf. Dr. Rolf Niedermeier